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THE SPECIAL VERDICT-THEORY AND PRACTICE
SAMUEL M. DR1VER*

A T THE

1949 Conference of Federal Judges of the Ninth Circuit I
discussed the special verdict, and my address was published in
the Washington Law Review.' My treatment of the subject necessarily
was largely theoretical as I had made very little use of the special
verdict practice up to that time. Drawing upon abundant published
material,2 I assembled and summarized the common criticisms of the
general verdict and the claimed advantages of the special verdict, and
expressed the conclusion that the latter, as prescribed in Rule 49 of
the Federal Civil Rules, was entitled to much more extensive use.
Having sold myself on that proposition, it was inevitable that I should
try it out in practice. I shall now endeavor to give the bench and bar
a candid account of the results of my experiment. Before doing so,
however, I think it would be helpful to discuss briefly the defects of
the general verdict which it is so often said the special verdict should
remedy or at least minimize.
Theoretically, as we tell our juries, it is the function of the judge to
search out and declare the law, and the function of the jury to find the
facts, and it is the jury's duty to accept and apply the law as announced
in the court's instructions. Actually, however, the jurors may misunderstand or deliberately disregard the charge and return a verdict in
accordance with their own ideas of what is right and just. If the verdict
is a general one, that is to say, a verdict by which the jury merely
decides the issues generally for the plaintiff or for the defendant, it is
impossible to ascertain whether or not the jury followed the court's
instructions. Since the jury has the power to disregard the instructions
and the power cannot be controlled, it is indistinguishable, for all practical purposes, from a right to decide both issues of law and issues
of fact.
*United States District Judge, Eastern District of Washington and member of
Supreme Court Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
125 WAsH. L. REv. 43.
2 See, for example, Judge Frank's majority opinion in Skidmore v. B. & 0. R. Co.,
167 F.(2d) 54 (C.C.A. 2nd 1948); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special,
29 YALE L. J. 253; Green, A New Development of Jury Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 715;
Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE
L. J. 588; McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions, 2 F.R.D. 177.
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No matter how many factual and legal questions may be involved
in a lawsuit, the general verdict answers them all in three words-"for
the plaintiff" or "for the defendant," and by what process the answer
is arrived at is an insoluble mystery. But since it is assumed that the
jury will understand and correctly apply to the facts the principles of
law embodied in the court's charge, the court has the duty of fully and
accurately instructing the jury as to the law. Failure to discharge that
duty correctly, it has been said, is the greatest single source of reversible error.' Appellate courts must assume that the jury has dutifully
considered, has understood and has correctly applied the instructions
and, therefore, that if the court's statement of the law is in any substantial particular incorrect, incomplete, or inaccurate, the general
verdict has thereby been affected. The assumption, of course, is absurd.
It is impossible in a few minutes to educate twelve laymen on the law
of a case, embracing, as it often does, complex and technical rules of
law, involved exceptions, and finely drawn legal distinctions. Many
times in my experience the foreman of a jury has sent me a note by the
bailiff asking some question which indicated that the jurors did not
have even a vague conception of the meaning of the court's instructions.
When a special verdict is used, the jury is required to return a special
written finding on each issue of fact presented. That is usually done by
having the jury give "yes" or "no" answers to fact questions, or by
having the jury make a selection from alternative written findings on
each issue of fact. The jury is thereby relieved of the burden of understanding and applying the law, thus leaving to it the comparatively
simple task of deciding issues of fact. The formulation of instructions
is greatly simplified as the court need give only such explanatory directions as may be necessary to enable the jury to understand the legal
terms employed and to make its findings upon the factual issues presented. The general verdict is an indivisible unit, and if it is bad in
part it is bad as a whole and must be set aside. The special verdict, on
the other hand, makes it possible to localize error, and the sound portions of the verdict may be saved. For example, if the jury has erred in
assessing the amount of damages in a personal injury case but otherwise returned sound findings as to negligence and contributory negligence a new trial can be had on the sole issue of the amount of damages.
Moreover, the special verdict tends to focus the attention of the jurors
3 GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY

351 (1930); see also

FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 449 (1947)

the State Courts, 3 F.R.D. 98, 109.

ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

and Rossman, The Judge-Jury Relationship in
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on the issues of fact which they are called upon to decide and should
give them a keener sense of responsibility and lessen the influence of
emotion upon the verdict.
The comparatively few commentators who disparage the special verdict and defend the general verdict do not claim that juries actually
understand and correctly apply the rules of law given to them in the
court's instructions. Their argument is that by taking a broad lay view
of the issues jurors add desirable flexibility in the application of
involved and sometimes harsh rules of law to the facts of a particular
case and thus dispense substantial common sense justice. As Professor
Moore puts it in a footnote of his recent edition of the Federal Rules:
Nor do we believe that trial judges are well advised to take special verdicts
in many jury cases. The notion that issues of "fact" are easily framed is
unsound. And the jury is not, nor should it become, a scientific fact finding
body. Its chief value is that it applies the "law," oftentimes a body of technical and refined theoretical principles and sometimes edged with harshness,
in an earthy fashion that comports with "justice" as conceived by the
masses, for whom after all the law is mainly meant to serve. The general
verdict is the answer from the man in the street .... 4
If Professor Moore and the others who subscribe to the views which
he has expressed are correct, then our system of elaborate, technically
accurate instructions to juries is a hypocritical farce. If the juror is
to be regarded as on a level with the man in the street, there is no point
in elevating the trial judge to the rarified atmosphere of a legal Mount
Olympus. If the jury's true function is to dispense "earthy" justice, the
court should be permitted to give it "earthy" instructions. The instructions should be on this order: Now, ladies and gentlemen, you have
heard the evidence. You will retire to the jury room and return a
verdict which you think is right and just.
I turn now to my own experience with the special verdict. During
the last fiscal year, that is to say, from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, I
presided in the trial of nine jury cases in which a special verdict could
have been submitted. (The figure does not include jury cases tried by
my colleague, Judge Lloyd L. Black,5 nor jury condemnation cases,'
which just about equal in number all other jury cases in the district.)
In one of the nine cases a verdict was directed. In two others general
4 MooRE'S FEDnER.
RULES (1949), Footnote to Rule 49, Sec. 0.05, p. 1148. See
also 2 BARRON AND HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDuRE 737 (Rules Ed.).
5Died August 23, 1950.
6 In the trial of such cases the special verdict practice prescribed by Rule 49(a)
is not available since condemnation cases are governed by the Federal Civil Rules as
to appeals but not otherwise. See Rule 81(7).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

verdicts were returned. In the remaining six cases special verdicts were
used. During the period under consideration it was my practice to
submit special verdicts in all cases coming under Rule 49(a), except
where one or both of the parties objected and succeeded in convincing
me that in the circumstances of the particular case a general verdict
was preferable. I am aware that my experience with the special verdict
has been very limited, both as to time and number of cases involved,
but with that in mind I do not hesitate to say that on the whole I regard
the results as satisfactory. With one exception, special fact findings
of the jury have been consistent. I have not been obliged to set aside
any special verdict or grant a new trial. There has been no appeal in
any of the six cases. With the one exception mentioned above the result
in each case, in my judgment, has been in accordance with law and the
weight of the evidence, and in the commonly understood sense, fair
and just.
So much for the credit side. On the other hand I have found that the
special verdict has definite disadvantages and in some cases raises
serious difficulties. Juries seem to have more trouble reaching an agreement on special verdicts. Most of them were obliged to deliberate for
twelve hours or longer. The difficulty of agreement is understandable.
As we all know, jury verdicts often represent compromises, and it is
not so easy to reach separate compromise agreements on several fact
findings of a special verdict as it is to agree on one all-inclusive general
verdict. I have reason to believe also that while many jurors will complacently acquiesce in a general verdict they are much more hesitant
about subscribing to a special verdict fact finding which they think is
not supported by the evidence.
In several instances when the foreman sent word to me by the bailiff
that the jurors could not agree and should be discharged, I had them
brought in and in open court talked to them in an effort to persuade
them to reach an agreement. I pointed out that jury trials are expensive
for the litigants and for the government, that if the case had to be tried
again it would, in all probability, be presented to another jury on
substantially the same evidence and that it would be no easier for the
future jury to agree than for the instant one. I qualified my remarks
by saying that no juror should sacrifice his settled convictions as to how
the issues should be decided merely for the sake of arriving at a verdict,
and I tried to avoid saying anything that might inferentially favor one
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side or the other.' I then sent the jury out for further deliberation.
I was not obliged to discharge the jury in any case because of disagreement, however, and it was not necessary to keep a jury in deliberation
for longer than thirty hours.
Another practical difficulty I find arises from lack of familiarity of
the lawyers with special verdict procedure. Lawyers are accustomed
to framing their requested instructions on the basis of general verdicts,
and so far I have not been very successful in my efforts to induce them
to change their methods to meet special verdict requirements. I announce at the outset of the trial that I propose to submit a special
verdict, and in some instances such announcement is made at the pretrial conference a week or more in advance of the trial, but nevertheless
the proposed instructions usually come in geared to the general verdict.
In a case where there are numerous complex issues it is difficult to
formulate a satisfactory special verdict either in the form of fact
questions or fact findings. In such a case the preparation of a large
number of fact findings is burdensome to the court and consideration
of them is likely to be confusing to the jury. It is sometimes possible
to frame the special verdict in such a way as to combine several detailed
issues of fact in one or two general, ultimate fact findings. However, if
the findings are broad and general, the result is that the court's instructions to the jury must be almost as extensive and elaborate as they
would be for a general verdict.8 For example, let us suppose that a
special verdict is to be submitted in an action for damages for personal
injuries. The plaintiff contends that the defendant was negligent in
seven separate particulars and there is some substantial evidence to
support each of them. The defendant claims that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in five particulars and the claims are likewise
sufficiently supported to take them to the jury. The jury could be
directed to find whether or not the party having the burden of proof has
established the facts on which each claim of negligence or contributory
negligence is based, but that would necessitate the submission of at
least twelve separate fact questions or fact findings to the jury and the
special verdict would be cumbersome and confusing. The other alternative is to ask the jury to find generally whether or not the defendant
was guilty of any of the claimed acts of negligence and whether the
plaintiff was guilty of any of the alleged acts of contributory negligence.
7
During the period under consideration neither side took any exception to the
court's remarks.
8 There is also the danger that an appellate court will regard the special verdict
as calling for conclusions of law rather than findings of ultimate facts.
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If such general findings are submitted, however, it is necessary for the
court to fully instruct the jury as to what constitutes negligence and
contributory negligence with reference to the various contentions of
the parties.
In those cases where the issues are numerous or complex, if the special verdict is to be employed at all, it seems to me that it should be
used in connection with pretrial conference procedure. By pretrial in
many cases the factual issues can be reduced in number and simplified
and clarified so as to make it practicable to embody them in special
verdict findings.
Special verdict practice in federal court cases, as I have stated, is
governed by Rule 49 (a) of the Federal Civil Rules.9 The state courts
of Washington have no comparable rule, but there is statutory authority for the special verdict in Sections 362 and 364 of Remington's
Revised Statutes. Those statutes are very old, however, dating back to
the territorial laws of 1854 and are essentially declaratory of the common law. The common law special verdict is of very ancient origin, but
it has not been used to any great extent principally because of the
danger of inadvertently omitting submission of some issue of fact to
the jury, thus undermining the verdict.' ° Rule 49 (a) has remedied that
infirmity by its provision that if the court fails to submit to the jury
any issue of fact each party shall be deemed to have waived his right
to trial by jury on that issue, and the court may make a finding thereon
unless demand for submission is made by one of the parties before the
case is sent to the jury. And even if the court fails to make a finding on
an omitted issue of fact it will be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict. If the special verdict
is to be extensively employed in the state courts of Washington it
seems to me that a state rule comparable to federal Rule 49 (a) should
be adopted. It should provide similar safeguards, and there may be
special problems raised by differences between federal and state practices which it should cover." The state already has the basis for pretrial
9 The special verdict provided for in Rule 49(a) should not be confused with the
provision in 49(b) for submission to the jury along with the general verdict of written
interrogatories upon one or more essential issues of fact.
'o See 2 BARRON AND HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 735, Sec. 1051;
3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 3097, Sec. 49.01.
11For example, the Washington state practice of allowing a majority of ten of

the twelve jurors to agree upon a verdict in a civil action. The Washington Supreme
Court has held that when the jury is polled at least ten of the jurors must declare a
special verdict to be their verdict and that a juror who has taken inconsistent positions,
on two different interrogatories or findings of the verdict, may not be counted as Qne
of the ten. Devoni v. Dept. of Labor and Indws.tries, 136 Wash. Dec. 202 (1950).
See note on the Devon case, this volume, p. 56.-ED.
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procedure, in Rule of Practice 18, set out in 18 Wash. (2d) page 44-a.12
It is substantially identical with the federal pretrial rule.'
It is my conclusion that judicious use of the special verdict will
improve the administration of justice in civil jury trials and that it
should be submitted in all cases in which it is practicable to do so, that
is to say, in cases where the factual issues are not too numerous or
complex. And its use can be extended if it is used in connection with
pretrial conference by which 'the issues are narrowed and simplified.
I think that it offers a fairer, more realistic approach to the determination of civil controversies by jury trial than the general verdict and
that with the special verdict the final result of the lawsuit is more likely
to be in accord with the law and the weight of the evidence.
Editor'sNote: The Washington Supreme Court adopted the Federal
Rule on Special Verdicts and Interrogatories, effective January 2, 1951,
thus making it too late to revise Judge Driver's article. The new rule
is Rule 43, 34A Wn. (2d) 107.

12 This is now Rule 16, 34A Wn. (2d)
Is Civil Rule 16.

80.ED.

